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ABSTRACT Canada’s news media ownership landscape changed 
dramatically in 2009-10 with the bankruptcy of Canwest Global 
Communication and the voluntary separation of the CTV network from the 
Globe and Mail national newspaper. These developments suggested failure 
of the newspaper-television convergence business model adopted by these 
companies a decade ago. One company has been able to make the 
convergence model work in Canada, however. Quebecor Media acquired 
the TVA network in Québec in 2000 to go along with its Sun Media chain 
of English-language newspapers. It subsequently acquired the Osprey 
newspaper chain to become one of the country’s largest newspaper 
publishers. Unlike other converged media companies in Canada and the 
U.S., however, Quebecor has remained profitable despite the recession 
that began in 2008. This paper examines financial data, including CRTC 
monitoring reports and annual reports from Quebecor and other 
companies, in an attempt to explain its success. One factor found to be of 
significance has been Quebecor’s diversification into more profitable areas, 
such as cable television and cellular telephony.  
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Quebecor Media has become one of the largest media corporations in 
Canada despite very modest origins. Unlike the country’s other converged 
newspaper-television companies—Canwest Global Communications and 
CTVglobemedia—Quebecor thrived even during the recession of the late 
2000s. While Canwest declared bankruptcy in 2009, resulting in the 
separate sale of its newspaper and television divisions, and 
CTVglobemedia divorced ownership of its television network from that of 
the Globe and Mail in 2010, Quebecor made a success of convergence. Its 
profit  margin  rose  steadily  despite the  economic  downturn,  from  26.7  
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percent in 2006 to more than 33 percent in 2009 and 2010. Quebecor’s 
financial success became increasingly problematic, however, to those 
concerned about concentrated corporate media power in Canada. Some of 
those most affected by Quebecor’s growing power were its workers. In 
2011, Quebecor forced a contract settlement on locked out staff at its 
Journal de Montréal newspaper by publishing for more than two years 
with only management personnel and contract writers by using content 
from the company’s accumulated other news outlets. Quebecor also started 
the controversial Sun News Network in 2011, which some called “Fox 
News North” for its conservative slant. This paper examines how Quebecor 
grew from modest origins, survived and even thrived during the economic 
downturn that broke up Canada’s other multimedia conglomerates, and 
emerged as one of Canada’s dominant media companies. It concludes that 
Quebecor did so by diversifying differently than Canwest and 
CTVglobemedia. Its diversification succeeded due to some unique market 
characteristics, but it did not proceed as planned, which ironically 
contributed to its success. 
 
 
DIVERSIFICATION THEORY 
Diversification, according to Chan-Olmsted (2006: 39), is “the dominant 
topic in the studies of corporate strategy.” The integration of additional 
enterprises into a business can be horizontal, vertical, or diagonal (Doyle, 
2002). Horizontal integration entails acquiring identical or very similar 
businesses and allows the firm to simply grow in size and market share. 
Vertical integration entails acquiring businesses that are involved at 
different stages of the same industry, for example in producing raw 
materials or in distributing the final product. A newspaper company could 
increase its vertical integration by acquiring a paper mill or a trucking 
company, while a movie studio could do so by taking over a talent agency 
or a chain of theatres. Diagonal integration diversifies the company into a 
related line of business. In media, diagonal integration was popular in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s under the strategy of convergence, which 
typically saw newspaper companies partner with television broadcasters. 
Expansion into an unrelated line of business is known as “conglomerate” 
diversification (Chan-Olmsted, 2006). Research has shown that firms that 
diversify into related fields tend to be more profitable, while those that 
diversify into unrelated areas tend to be more stable (Amit and Livnat, 
1988). Related diversification benefits from “economies of scope and scale 
through the leveraging of core competencies,” noted Chan-Olmsted (2006: 
41). 
 
Unrelated diversification, on the other hand, may derive benefits from 
the possible synergies created by leveraging corporate restructuring 
and general management capabilities, learning “best practices” in 
other business units, improving capital allocations by forming an 
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internal capital market, and reducing financial risk through a 
diversified business portfolio (Chan-Olmsted, 2006: 41). 
 
Diversification is a potentially important strategy for media businesses 
because they are more subject than firms in most industries to variations 
in the business cycle. Because they are reliant for the vast majority of 
their revenues on advertising, which is a discretionary expense for most 
businesses, media companies tend to see their revenues fall sharply during 
an economic downturn (Picard, 2001; Picard & Rimmer, 1999). Diversi-
fication can be used as a strategy to ameliorate this boom-bust cycle. 
Research has found that while the search for content-sharing synergies 
with related media has been largely unsuccessful and thus still leaves 
media businesses subject to fluctuations in the economy, diversification 
into unrelated fields can help soften the effect of downturns (Chan-
Olmsted & Chang, 2003; Jung & Chan-Olmsted, 2005; Stephan, 2005).  
A leading example of conglomerate diversification by a media company 
is the Washington Post Company, which in 1984 acquired the Kaplan 
educational preparation firm. In 1993, Kaplan contributed 5 percent of the 
company’s revenues, but due to its aggressive expansion that increased to 
20 percent by 2001 (Scherer, 2002). By 2006, as newspaper circulation and 
advertising fell industry-wide, Kaplan was contributing 43 percent of the 
Post’s $3.9 billion in annual revenues (Gunther, 2007). The following year, 
Kaplan accounted for more than half the revenues of the Washington Post 
Co., which as a result rebranded itself from a media company to “an 
education and media company.” Television stations (8 percent), magazines 
such as Newsweek (6 percent), and cable companies (15 percent), together 
contributed more to company revenues than the 21 percent accounted for 
by its flagship Washington Post (Ahrens, 2007a). By 2010, due to Kaplan’s 
expansion in the U.S. and abroad to include vocational schools and even an 
online university, it contributed 62 percent of company revenues (Burd, 
2010). Other newspaper publishers have also successfully diversified into 
unrelated businesses. Financial Times publisher Pearson owns one of the 
world’s largest textbook companies. Prisa, publisher of the Spanish daily 
El Pais, has a profitable education division that includes the largest 
publisher of textbooks in Latin America (Scherer, 2008). Torstar Corp., 
publisher of the Toronto Star, acquired the Harlequin romance novel 
publisher in 1981 (Olive, 2004). In the depths of a recession in 1990, 
Harlequin contributed $64.4 million of Torstar’s $104 million operating 
profit that year (Siklos, 1991). The erstwhile Canadian newspaper chain 
Southam Inc. owned the Coles bookstore chain from 1976 until 1995. 
Most media companies tend to diversify diagonally into other media-
related enterprises, hoping to find the synergistic advantages of cross-
media consolidation that have proved elusive. By the mid-2000s, however, 
enthusiasm for newspaper-television convergence began to wane (Ahrens, 
2007b; Thornton & Keith, 2009). The pioneering AOL-Time Warner 
merger that galvanized corporate enthusiasm for convergence at the turn 
of the millennium proved perhaps the most disastrous business merger of 
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all time (Motavalli, 2002; Klein, 2003; Swisher, 2003; Munk, 2004). The 
company quickly dropped the acronym of its digital arm from its title and 
sold a share of AOL ownership to Google, finally spinning it off into a 
separate company in 2009. Media conglomerate Viacom split into two 
separate companies in 2005, including the CBS Corporation to hold its 
broadcasting operations. The A.H. Belo Corp. of Texas similarly created 
different publicly-traded companies to manage its newspaper and 
television assets in 2008. These corporate separations contributed to a 
trend toward “de-convergence” (Dal, 2011). 
 
 
COMPANY ORIGINS 
Quebecor was incorporated in 1965 as a holding company for the 
newspaper and printing assets accumulated since 1950 by its founder, 
Pierre Péladeau. Following his graduation from McGill University with a 
law degree at age 25, Péladeau purchased the Montréal neighborhood 
newspaper Le Journal de Rosemont using $1,500 he borrowed from his 
mother as a down payment (Pitts, 2002). That was followed quickly by a 
string of similar acquisitions. In 1951 he bought L'Est Montréalais and 
also launched a group of three neighborhood papers—Le Guide de l'Est, Le 
Guide de Saint-Michel and Le Guide de Saint-Laurent. According to 
Quebecor’s online corporate history, when television broadcasting began in 
Québec, Péladeau “quickly grasped the new medium’s future impact.” To 
capitalize on that impact, however, he remained in the newspaper 
business. In 1955, he launched Nouvelles et Pontins, the first of a series of 
weekly newspapers focused on celebrities. Péladeau’s growing newspaper 
empire also rode a current of social change in Québec, helping to lead that 
province’s “Quiet Revolution” of secularism and separatist sentiment in 
addition to covering television stars. “They also assailed Québec’s 
hidebound elites,” noted the Quebecor history, “which were being 
overtaken by the pace of social change, and attacked political dirty tricks, 
braving legal difficulties to do so” (Quebecor, n.d.). As a result of his 
business and social acumen, Péladeau was a millionaire by age 34.  
In 1954, Péladeau began to vertically integrate by diversifying into the 
printing business. He bought the presses of the defunct newspaper Le 
Canada and opened a printing shop in Montréal called L’Imprimerie 
Hebdo. Péladeau became Canada’s first newspaper publisher to establish a 
rotary press in 1962, which he named Montréal Offset. In 1964, Montréal’s 
largest daily newspaper, La Presse, was shut for seven months by striking 
press operators. Péladeau mustered all of his journalism and printing 
resources to fill the gap with the tabloid Journal de Montréal, which he 
published out of the offices of Montréal Offset. It soon grew to 80,000 
circulation, but fell to 10,000 once La Presse resumed publishing (Pitts, 
2002). The reason for the drop-off in circulation, according to the Quebecor 
history, was because the Journal’s distributor abandoned the upstart once 
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the strike was over. This led to another successful foray into vertical 
integration. 
 
Never one to back down from a fight, Péladeau used the setback as a 
growth opportunity. In the space of 24 hours, he assembled a fleet of 
vans and founded Les Messageries Dynamiques to distribute all the 
publications produced by his printing plants. The company quickly 
became a cornerstone of his empire (Quebecor, n.d.). 
 
Once its distribution was assured, the Journal de Montréal slowly but 
surely exploited the tabloid formula for newspaper popularity to overtake 
its broadsheet rival. “The tabloid’s formula of sensationalist crime, 
entertainment and sports took off from that point, until it overtook La 
Presse and reached 330,000 circulation in 1981” (Pitts, 2002: 84). By then, 
the Journal de Montréal was the second-largest circulation newspaper in 
Canada behind only the Toronto Star. In 1967, Péladeau launched Le 
Journal de Québec in Québec City using the same formula. In 1972, 
Quebecor went public in order to raise capital to finance an expansion, 
listing first on the New York Stock Exchange and then on the Montréal 
Stock Exchange. It spent $2 million of the proceeds from the sale of stock 
on a new printing plant that enabled it to compete for contracts to print 
American magazines circulated in Canada. It also began an expansion into 
the printing market outside Québec with the acquisition of Graphic Web in 
Ontario. In 1974, Quebecor exploited a market niche that had been created 
in Montréal by the reluctance of the Star and Gazette dailies to publish on 
the Sabbath. It started the city’s only English-language Sunday 
newspaper, the Sunday Express, which published until 1985 (Quebecor, 
n.d.). In 1977, it expanded into the U.S. by launching the tabloid 
Philadelphia Journal in competition with a trio of long-publishing dailies. 
According to Péladeau, the Philadelphia papers cut their advertising rates 
in response to the new competition and the Journal was forced to fold after 
losing $14 million in five years (Palmeri, 1990).  
Quebecor aggressively expanded into the printing and paper industries 
in the 1980s. In 1985, it bought its first printing plant in the U.S., Pendell 
Printing of Michigan (Quebecor, 2000). In 1987, it went into partnership 
with UK publisher Robert Maxwell to buy control of Donohue Inc., a 
leading Canadian forest products company, from the Québec government 
for $320 million. That assured Quebecor a steady paper supply. The 
following year, it bought telephone book printer BCE PubliTech Inc. from 
Bell Canada Enterprises for $161 million, which made Quebecor the 
largest printing company in Canada. In 1990, Maxwell sold a controlling 
interest in his U.S. printing plants Maxwell Graphics to Quebecor, with 
Maxwell keeping a 25-percent interest. Péladeau formed Quebecor 
Printing, beginning a lucrative strategic alliance with Maxwell, which 
Canadian Business noted “included a noncompetition agreement and 
effectively carved up the North American market” (Crawford, 1993). By 
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1990, Quebecor was described in the business magazine Forbes as “one of 
the most vertically integrated communications outfits in the world.”  
 
It controls a forest products company that supplies two-thirds of the 
paper for its printing presses, which in turn print Quebecor’s mostly 
French-language publications, including 4 daily newspapers, 44 
weeklies and 20 magazines. Quebecor also handles most of the 
newsstand distribution in the province of Québec (Palmeri, 1990). 
 
In 1988, Péladeau attempted to capitalize on Quebecor’s vertical 
integration by venturing into the English-language daily newspaper 
market in Montréa . In partnership with Maxwell, who provided design 
expertise from his Mirror group in the UK, Quebecor launched the tabloid 
Daily News in March of that year in an attempt to fill the void created by 
the closure of the Montréal Star in 1979. Despite initial enthusiasm that 
saw its first press run of 80,000 copies sell out, circulation of the Daily 
News soon fell below 20,000 and the newspaper ceased publication in late 
1989. According to Gorman (2004), the Daily News failed because of the 
city’s shrinking Anglophone population and because of the tabloid’s 
inexperienced management and inconsistent content. The Daily News, 
noted Gorman, was barely mentioned in Quebecor: A Living History, a 
book marking the company’s fiftieth anniversary that was published in 
2000 (Gorman, 2004).  
The Maxwell alliance provided a windfall for Quebecor after the 
British press magnate died after falling from his yacht in mid-ocean in 
1991. Following his death, irregularities at Maxwell’s businesses became 
exposed. “Péladeau was suddenly embarrassed with a wealth of 
opportunities to buy back all of Maxwell’s shares in his companies,” 
observed Canadian Business. “This he did at bargain prices, noting that he 
‘made a very good deal’ on the remnants of Maxwell’s empire” (Crawford, 
1993). The $510 million purchase of the remainder of Maxwell Graphics, 
which printed Time, Sports Illustrated, and TV Guide, was made in 
partnership with the provincial pension plan Caisse de dépôt et placement 
du Québec, which contributed $115 million. The powerful Caisse managed 
more than $100 billion in assets and used its financial clout to support 
Québec businesses (Pitts, 2002). As the Maxwell partnership ended, thus 
began another important strategic alliance for Quebecor. Its government-
subsidized success, however, took a toll on competition in Canada. As a 
result of its acquisitions, concentration of ownership in the Canadian 
printing industry soared, with the five largest companies controlling 35 
percent of the domestic market, compared to 19 percent by the top ten 
commercial printers in the U.S. (Crawford, 1993). 
Quebecor also diversified diagonally, sometimes into businesses 
related to the newspaper industry, and sometimes into unrelated 
enterprises. It bought its first magazine, Vivre, in 1974, and launched 
Femmes d’aujourd’hui in 1980. Quebecor’s magazine division became 
known as Publicor, and was managed by Isabelle Péladeau, the founder’s 
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eldest daughter, who was also vice-president of Quebecor 
Communications. Publicor expanded in 1988, launching several more 
home décor and renovation magazines (Quebecor, 2000). In 1976, Quebecor 
branched out into music distribution with the purchase of Service de 
Musique Trans-Canada, which it merged a decade later with Le Groupe de 
Musical Experts to form Le Groupe de Musique Trans-Canada. In the 
early 1990s, it acquired the Ed. Archambault Co. chain of book and music 
stores and merged it with its existing music holdings into a Groupe 
Archambault. In 1983, Quebecor bought book publisher Quebec-Livres, 
along with distributor Nouvelles Messageries Internationale du Livre. In 
1994, it bought Québec book publisher Libre Expression, adding the St. 
Remy Media publishing house the following year (Qubecor, 2000). 
 
 
FAMILY SUCCESSION  
The 1990s saw the inevitable transition from Quebecor’s guidance by its 
founder to new directions under second-generation leadership. Péladeau’s 
sons Érik and Pierre-Karl gradually took more of an active role in 
company management throughout the decade. In 1991, at age 29, Pierre 
Karl took over as president of Quebecor’s publishing division, while the 
following year Érik was named senior vice-president of its printing arm. 
Pierre Karl had worked in the company since age 16, when he was as a 
summer photographer for the Journal de Montréal before attending 
university for philosophy and law degrees. According to Canadian 
Business magazine, the younger Péladeau’s initial foray into Quebecor 
management brought him a reputation for being “an arrogant busybody 
who liked to throw his weight around” (Chartrand, 1999). According to the 
Globe and Mail, he became known as “a ruthless cost-cutter and abrasive 
boss.” 
 
It’s not certain which irked Pierre Péladeau the most—his son’s smart-
ass demeanour or his undeniable brilliance. Either way, he soon 
discovered he didn’t want him around and, in 1994, sent Pierre Karl 
into exile in Europe (Yakabuski, 2000).  
 
In four years, Pierre Karl spearheaded acquisitions in England, 
France, and Spain that turned Quebecor into Europe’s largest commercial 
printer, with annual revenue of $800 million (Chartrand, 1999). Érik 
Péladeau, who never completed university, was named in 1994 to head a 
new Quebecor Multimedia subsidiary, but his hard-driving younger 
brother soon emerged as their father’s eventual successor. When Pierre 
Péladeau died in 1997 after suffering a heart attack, Pierre Karl returned 
from Paris and assumed his father’s post as Quebecor CEO, later buying 
out his brother’s ownership interest in the company. Through 2000, he led 
Quebecor on a spree of annual acquisitions, each more expensive than the 
last. In 1998, it was the $983-million takeover of the tabloid newspaper 
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chain Sun Media, which his father had bid for but failed to acquire a few 
years earlier. Included in the purchase was Sun Media’s news website 
Canadian Online Explorer (canoe.ca). In 1999, Quebecor spent $2.7 billion 
to buy the 58 printing plants of Connecticut-based World Color Press Inc., 
which made it the world’s biggest commercial printer. In doing so, 
however, Quebecor took on considerable debt, raising the combined 
company Quebecor World’s debt-to-capitalization ratio from 37 percent to 
62 percent (Yakabuski, 2000).  
The largest Quebecor acquisition of all, however, was the $5.4-billion 
purchase in late 2000 of Groupe Videotron Ltée, a diversified media 
company that owned the largest cable provider in Québec and a controlling 
interest in the provincial television network TVA. The Caisse was 
instrumental in this acquisition as well, blocking the proposed sale of 
Groupe Videotron to Toronto-based cable company Rogers Communication 
through its 17-percent ownership of the company. It wanted to keep 
Groupe Videotron in Québec hands and approached Quebecor about 
forming a partnership, in which the Caisse took 45 percent ownership. A 
new company called Quebecor Media was formed to hold Groupe 
Videotron’s assets, along with the media assets of Quebecor. The new 
company was owned 55 percent by Quebecor Inc., which also owned 100 
percent of Quebecor World. An emboldened Pierre Karl Péladeau vowed to 
turn Quebecor Media into one of the world’s ten largest media companies 
(Yakabuski, 2000). 
Péladeau’s hubris did not last long. Quebecor Inc. had financed most of 
its string of acquisitions, and the Groupe Videotron purchase brought its 
total debt to about $6.7 billion. A quick sale of Videotron’s 
telecommunications assets had been planned to raise as much as $1 billion 
to partially reimburse the Caisse and to relieve Quebecor Inc.’s debt load. 
These included its Videotron Telecom arm and its share of the Microcell 
Telecommunications mobile phone company. The stock market bubble in 
technology shares burst soon afterward, however, lowering the value of 
those companies to less than $200 million and preventing their quick sale 
(Arbour, 2001). Quebecor Inc. was forced to enter the high-interest U.S. 
“junk bond” market to raise $1.3 billion in short-term financing and to sell 
off assets to reduce debt. It sold its 11-percent share in the forestry firm 
Abitibi-Consolidated Inc. for $600 million and 25 percent of Quebecor 
World for $500 million (Marotte, 2001). It was forced by the Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to sell the 
TQS network that Pierre Péladeau had bought before his death in 1997. 
The broadcasting regulator would only approve Quebecor Media’s 
purchase of TVA if it sold the smaller network, but in the slumping market 
for media properties it could command a price of only $75 million. 
After four consecutive quarters of losses due to the early 2000s 
recession, Quebecor’s debt still stood at $4 billion, which prompted bond 
rating agency Standard & Poor’s to place it on credit watch (Marotte, 
2002). From a high of $61.50 before its Videotron purchase, Quebecor stock 
bottomed out in 2002 at $12.25. By early 2003, however, Quebecor had 
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sold more assets, paid off most of its high-interest debt, restructured other 
debt, and was taken off credit watch by Standard & Poor’s (Gibbens, 2003). 
With the improving economy, Quebecor Media began turning a modest 
profit by mid-2003 and was able to pay down more debt, which stood at 
Cdn$1.4 billion by that fall (Silcoff, 2003). 
 
 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
Quebecor Media experienced a financial turnaround in the mid-2000s, and 
by decade’s end it was thriving thanks in large part to its originally-
unwanted sideline in telephony. Videotron began to expand into lucrative 
areas of service such as broadband Internet and 3G wireless, and in 2005 
became the first major Canadian cable company to offer cable telephone 
service. Quebecor was also able to capitalize on the content synergies of 
media convergence where most other multimedia conglomerates failed. 
Part of the reason for that was Quebecor’s dominance of the Québec 
market, and part was the unique characteristics of that market. TVA 
helped demonstrate the cross-promotional potential of convergence in the 
md-2000s with the hit program Star Academie, which was described as a 
cross between American Idol and Big Brother. It was heavily cross-
promoted in Quebecor’s newspapers and in turn boosted its online and 
cable divisions. Analysts began rethinking the possibilities of media 
convergence, at least in the Québec market. “If convergence can work 
anywhere,” wrote one, “it should work in Québec, a homogenous island of 
French-speakers in the New World where Quebecor is Number 1 in most 
media categories.” 
 
Star Academie boosted TVA’s audience share, was the launch vehicle 
for Videotron’s video-on-demand service, pulled thousands of new 
subscribers to Videotron’s high-speed Internet service, and yielded 
Quebecor-produced CDs, DVDs and books that were peddled in the 
company’s music, books and video-rental shops (Olive, 2003). 
 
Its improved fortunes enabled Quebecor to embark on another 
expansion program. In 2004, it bought TV station Toronto 1 for $46 million 
(Brent, 2004). In 2005, it bought Quebec’s largest book publisher, Sogides 
Ltée, for an undisclosed price and merged it with Libre Expression 
(Marotte, 2005). In 2007, it won a takeover battle with Torstar for Osprey 
Media, which owned 54 Ontario newspapers, including twenty dailies. The 
$414-million purchase, when added to its Sun Media chain, gave Quebecor 
more daily newspapers than any company in Canada (Robertson, 2007). 
Quebecor had thirty-seven dailies, well more than the thirteen owned by 
Canwest Publications, although their total weekly circulation of 6.4 
million was less than Canwest’s 8.2 million (Canadian Newspaper 
Association, 2010). In 2008, Quebecor acquired seventeen licences for 3G 
advanced wireless services, including spectrum in the Toronto area as well 
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as in Quebec. Péladeau called Quebecor’s $1-billion wireless play a 
“watershed event” in the company’s history and said it would be “the 
cornerstone of our business model and strategy for years to come” 
(Péladeau, 2008). 
Quebecor’s serendipitous diversification into telecommunication saw it 
prosper during the late 2000s recession while Canada’s other multimedia 
giants faltered. It announced in early 2009 that while its newspaper and 
television revenues dropped in the fourth quarter of 2008, its 
telecommunication revenue rose 11 percent, resulting in a 4 percent rise 
overall. Customers paid more for faster Internet, video-on-demand, and 
packages that included home phone service. Vidéotron added a record 
number of digital cable subscribers in the quarter and said half of its cable 
customers had adopted its residential phone service, with most switching 
from Bell Canada (Avery, 2009). In 2010, Videotron announced an online 
television service called Illico Web, which offered customers who 
subscribed to both its cable television and Internet services access to 
thirty-two Internet channels, including twenty-four in French 
(Krashinsky, 2010). That fall, it launched a new mobile service that 
included “quadruple-play” discounts for its cable, Internet, and telephone 
customers. It offered mobile streaming video for its Illico subscribers, 
including NHL hockey games (Hadekel, 2010). NHL hockey was something 
Péladeau tried to bring into Quebecor directly, bidding unsuccessfully in 
2009 for the Montréal Canadiens franchise. In 2011, Quebecor pledged up 
to $200 million for the naming rights to a new arena planned for Québec 
City in an attempt to bring an NHL franchise there (White, 2011). 
Not all financial developments were positive for Quebecor, however. 
Quebecor World never recovered from the recession of the early 2000s, 
which made it increasingly difficult to service the large debt load it took on 
in acquiring World Color Press. Industry overcapacity led to downward 
pressure on prices, and the emerging technology of the Internet depressed 
demand. Quebecor’s European acquisitions were beset by labour problems 
and suffered from outdated equipment. The company closed ten plants and 
cut more than 3,000 jobs, but it wasn’t enough to reverse the financial tide 
that engulfed Quebecor World. In 2008, the company filed for bankruptcy 
and was later spun off into a separate entity and sold. For Péladeau, noted 
the Montréal Gazette, the failure in printing was more than balanced by 
the success brought by Quebecor Media’s diversification into 
telecommunication. 
 
Now, Quebecor World is virtually worthless, while Quebecor Media has 
staged a stunning comeback thanks to Vidéotron’s entry into the local 
telephone market in Quebec. Investors have been so optimistic about 
Vidéotron’s future that the Péladeaus were close to becoming 
billionaires again last year as Quebecor’s shares hit a high of $43.25 
(Delean, 2008). 
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IDEOLOGICAL ABOUT-FACE 
Pierre Péladeau relied to a considerable extent for his success on keeping 
labour unions on his side. His first major enterprise, the Journal de 
Montréal, was enabled by a strike at La Presse, which Péladeau 
eventually surpassed by keeping labor peace through making generous 
contract concessions. In the printing business, he similarly preferred to 
keep the presses rolling by keeping the unions on the job. A seminal 
moment in his relationship with his son Pierre Karl, and one that 
foreshadowed an eventual change in philosophy at Quebecor, reportedly 
took place in 1993. As head of Quebecor’s media arm, Pierre Karl Péladeau 
prepared for negotiations with press operators at the Journal de Montréal 
by secretly training managers to run the presses and refurbishing an 
abandoned factory in Ontario to print the newspaper. After a five-month 
lockout, however, Pierre Péladeau stepped in and acceded to the union’s 
demands, sending his son off to head Quebecor’s European operations 
shortly thereafter (Chartrand, 1999). When Pierre Karl Péladeau took over 
as Quebecor CEO following his father’s death, a change in philosophy was 
inevitable. The direction it took was somewhat surprising, however, given 
the scion’s past as a student Marxist. According to Canadian Business, 
Pierre Karl Péladeau was “fascinated with communism and Marxism” as 
an undergraduate and even distributed leaflets for the Communist party 
(Chartrand, 1999). The Globe and Mail saw the rejection of capitalism as a 
rebellious youthful phase. 
 
He chose to study philosophy at the left-leaning Université du Québec 
à Montréal, spurning the establishment Université de Montréal, his 
father's alma mater. It was at UQAM that Pierre Karl, né Pierre-Carl, 
adopted the current spelling of his name, apparently in honour of Karl 
Marx. But Péladeau seems to have abandoned his leftist convictions as 
quickly as he embraced them (Yakabuski, 2000). 
 
One of the longest-running projects in Pierre Karl Péladeau’s tenure as 
Quebecor CEO was bringing the company’s unions to heel. In 2003, 
Quebecor locked out workers at its newly-acquired Vidéotron subsidiary 
for ten months to force contract concessions on their unions that included a 
three-year wage freeze, increased working hours for no additional pay, and 
the elimination of more than 200 jobs (King, 2003). In 2007, Quebecor 
locked out editorial and office staff at the Journal de Québec for fifteen 
months to force contract concessions on them that included increased 
working hours and requiring reporters to create content for the Internet 
(Surridge & Malhomme, 2008). Six weeks after firing the CEO of Sun 
Media in 2008 and taking management control himself, Péladeau laid off 
600 of its staff just before Christmas. Quebecor had recently announced a 
$45 million quarterly profit (Shalom, 2008).  
Convergence was both an end for Quebecor in its labor relations and a 
means to achieving that end. In early 2009, Sun Media locked out more 
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than 250 workers at its Journal de Montréal and continued to publish with 
management personnel while demanding contract concessions. These 
included lengthening the workweek by 25 percent without additional pay, 
reducing benefits by 20 percent, laying off 75 staff, and introducing an 
“unlimited convergence plan.” The plan would require newsroom staff to 
produce content for all Quebecor media, including its canoe.ca websites 
and its television outlets (Derfel, 2009). Quebecor continued to publish the 
Journal with only management and contract personnel by using content 
from its other myriad media outlets that was distributed electronically 
through a new QMI news agency. As the lockout entered its third year, 
Péladeau was called before public hearings held by the Québec National 
Assembly into whether the province’s labour code should be revised to 
prevent what some called the “perfect lockout.” Québec law prohibited the 
use of replacement workers during a labour dispute, but Quebecor 
exploited a loophole that allowed it to set up QMI using information 
technology (Sequin, 2011). Later that month, Journal de Montréal workers 
finally capitulated by agreeing not only to the concessions originally 
demanded by Quebecor, but to the loss of 191 out of 253 jobs (Magder, 
2011). 
Péladeau’s ideological disposition also became apparent in his choice of 
senior Quebecor management. Soon after taking over as CEO, he recruited 
former Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who was 
a long-time Quebecor director, to help him run the company. Mulroney, a 
Montréal lawyer who in 1970 had negotiated the first labour agreement at 
the Journal de Montréal, took over as temporary head of the company’s 
Sun Media unit in 1999 (Doughtery, 1999). He was instrumental behind 
the scenes in both the Sun Media purchase in 1998 and the acquisition of 
World Color Press the following year (Yakabuski, 2004). In 2001, as 
Quebecor struggled to make convergence work, Mulroney reportedly 
traveled to New York to introduce Péladeau to senior media executives 
with whom he was acquainted through his directorships on numerous 
other boards (Yakabuski, 2003). In 2002, the Globe and Mail reported that 
Mulroney had “shouldered more and more of the consultative burden” at 
Quebecor and had acted as “chief mentor” for Péladeau. Mulroney’s former 
communication director, Luc Lavoie, also joined Quebecor (Pitts & 
Marotte, 2002).  
The question of Péladeau’s ideology became of concern to some 
Canadians in 2010 as Quebecor applied to the CRTC for a licence to start a 
national all-news television channel called Sun News Network, which 
others dubbed “Fox News North” for its avowed populist temperament. 
“We’re taking on the mainstream media,” said network head Kory 
Teneycke, a former communication director for Conservative Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper. “We’re taking on smug, condescending, often 
irrelevant journalism. We’re taking on political correctness” (Wells et al., 
2010). The network was expected to promote a conservative perspective as 
a result not only of its corporate pronouncements, but also because of the 
rightward turn taken by Quebecor’s other media outlets. Maclean’s 
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magazine noted that the Journal de Montréal had recently “veered 
considerably to the right,” while TVA’s 24-hour news channel LCN was 
“decidedly more opinionated” than its competition at Radio-Canada. 
 
The Journal, observers say, has largely abandoned its left-leaning 
roots and adopted the populist conservative voice typical of the Sun 
papers – a voice echoed on Quebecor’s television assets. With a few 
notable exceptions, its stable of columnists is on the right side of the 
spectrum (Wells et al., 2010). 
 
 
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
As Quebecor locked out workers at the Journal de Montréal  in early 2009, 
union official Raynald Leblanc called it “incomprehensible” that the 
younger Péladeau would end the 45 year of labour peace on which his 
father had built the newspaper’s success. “This is a newspaper that makes 
a lot of money and that is in excellent financial shape,” Leblanc said, 
claiming that the Journal had earned more than $50 million the previous 
year on revenues of $200 million, for a profit margin of more than 25 
percent. The company denied those figures but would not disclose the 
Journal’s financial results, saying they were confidential (Derfel, 2009). 
While the details of each individual newspaper’s performance were not 
outlined in its financial reports, as a publicly-traded company Quebecor 
was required by law to publish its earnings for investors. An analysis of its 
annual reports from 2004 through 2010 shows that not only did Quebecor 
Media increasingly prosper during that period, its newspaper division also 
did well. The main driver of Quebecor profits, however, was its 
telecommunications division, including cable and telephone services. 
Quebecor Media revenues increased 40 percent over the seven-year 
period, rising steadily from $2.386 billion in 2004 to $4 billion in 2010. 
Newspaper revenues rose as well, from $888 million in 2004 to $1.181 
billion in 2008, although most of that increase was from the 2007 
acquisition of Osprey Media, which reported revenues of $230 million in 
2006. Newspaper revenues at Quebecor declined after 2008, to $1.055 
billion in 2010. More than three quarters (78 percent) of Quebecor’s $1.634 
billion revenue increase from 2004 to 2010 was due to higher 
telecommunications revenue, which rose $1.27 billion (See Table 1). 
While Quebecor’s telecommunication revenue more than doubled over 
the period, rising 135 percent, its operating earnings1 from 
telecommunications almost tripled, rising 185 percent. Its earnings from 
newspapers and broadcasting fluctuated during the period. While 
telecommunications provided just over half of Quebecor Media earnings 
                                              
1
 Operating earnings equals revenue minus expenses, before interest payments, taxes, depreciation, or 
amortization charges, which is a common accounting measure known as EBITDA. 
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(52 percent) in 2004, it was responsible for more than three quarters of 
total earnings (78 percent) by 2010 (See Table 2). 
The reason for the growth in Quebecor Media’s earnings from 
telecommunications is apparent from its operating profit margins 
(earnings as a percentage of revenue). From less than 40 percent in mid-
decade, Quebecor Media’s profit margin in telecommunications reached 
almost 50 percent by decade’s end. Its profits in newspapers eroded 
slightly over the period, but during the final three years held steady at 
about 19 percent. Quebecor Media’s newspapers were consistently more 
profitable than its television operations, and in 2006 were more than twice 
as profitable. Profit margins in the Other category were reduced by head 
office expenses (See Table 3). 
 
 
Table 1. Quebecor Media revenues (millions) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Telecommunications 937 1,080 1,309 1,552 1,804 2,001 2,209 
Newspapers 888 015 928 1,028 1,181 1,055 1,035 
Broadcasting 358 401 393 415 437 439 449 
Other 206 311 370 371 778 505 307 
TOTAL 2,386 2,606 3,000 3,366 3,730 3,806 4,000 
Source: Quebecor annual reports 
 
 
Table 2. Quebecor Media operating earnings (millions) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Telecommunications 364 413 512 643 798 973 1,036 
Newspapers 228 222 207 226 227 199 200 
Broadcasting 80 53 42 59 66 80 76 
Other 27 48 27 21 30 25 17 
TOTAL 699 736 788 949 1,121 1,277 1,329 
Source: Quebecor annual reports 
 
 
Table 3. Quebecor Media profit margin (percent) 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Telecommunications 38.9 38.2 39.1 41.4 44.2 48.6 46.9 
Newspapers 25.6 24.2 22.3 22.0 19.2 18.0 19.3 
Broadcasting 22.3 13.2 10.7 14.2 15.1 18.2 16.9 
Other 13.0 15.4 6.0 3.7 3.8 4.9 5.5 
TOTAL 29.3 28.2 26.3 28.2 30.0 33.7 33.2 
Source: Quebecor annual reports 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The average annual profit margin of a Fortune 500 company has 
historically been 4.7 percent (Tully, 2010). Profits in the newspaper 
business have been higher  than  in most  other  industries  due to  their 
greater  vertical integration (Morton, 1994). Widespread predictions of the 
demise of the newspaper business have been made since the Internet 
began competing for the attention of readers and for the advertising 
dollars that usually follow them (Meyer, 2004). Quebecor’s financial 
results belie those predictions, at least in the short term, as despite the 
economic downturn of the late 2000s, its newspaper earnings have 
remained robust.  
CRTC data show that the revenues of privately-owned conventional 
television broadcasters declined 7.8 percent from 2005 to 2009, while their 
average profit margin fell from 18.3 percent to 11.1 percent. Revenues of 
cable companies, by contrast, grew by 7.4 percent from 2007 to 2009, when 
their average profit margin rose to 45.1 percent. The average profit margin 
for wireless telephone providers was 44.9 percent in 2007 and 2008, falling 
to 43.1 percent in 2009. Cable companies increased their revenues from 
high-speed Internet service from $1.38 billion in 2005 to $2.42 billion in 
2009, for an annual growth rate of 15.1 percent. Subscription prices in the 
unregulated cable and satellite television industry rose at more than twice 
the level of inflation from 2002 to 2009 (CRTC, 2010). 
The magnitude of earnings by media companies in Canada has 
occasionally been a source of amazement. A Special Senate Subcommittee 
on Mass Media that was formed in 1969 forced media companies to open 
their books and described what it found as “astonishing.” From 1958 to 
1967, average before-tax profits at Canadian newspapers ranged from 23.4 
percent to 30.5 percent, while in radio they ranged from 21 percent to 26 
percent and in television they varied from 36 percent to 64 percent 
between 1964 and 1968 (Canada, 1970). A Senate committee on news 
media reported in 2004 that between 1999 and 2003 average profits 
ranged from 18.5 percent to 22.7 percent in radio, and from 13.6 percent to 
18.6 percent in television (Canada, 2004). It found that profits for the 
major newspaper chains ranged in 2005 from 17 percent to 24 percent 
(Canada, 2006).  
Their reduced revenues in the late 2000s prompted the CTV and 
Global Television networks to demand that the CRTC order the cable 
providers pay them a per-subscriber “fee for carriage.” The CRTC twice 
denied the request before finally acceding to it following the intervention 
of the Conservative government after station closures and a publicity 
campaign by the networks (Edge, 2011). Canwest Global Communications 
was forced to declare bankruptcy in 2009 as a result of its high debt load, 
which proved unsustainable with reduced revenues. Its newspaper 
division and television network were sold separately, with cable company 
Shaw Communication buying the latter. Bell Canada reacquired the CTV 
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network in 2010, separating its ownership from that of the Globe and Mail 
(Edge, 2010). 
Quebecor is an example of successful diversification into both related 
and unrelated lines of business. Its diversification into the high-growth 
areas of cable television and digital telephony, while intended in 2000 to 
be short-lived, was a key to Quebecor Media’s robust finances by decade’s 
end. When those assets could not be divested quickly due to the recession 
of the early 2000s, they ironically came to play a role in the firm’s 
recovery. Another key to Quebecor Media’s success was the insular nature 
of the French-language media market in Quebec, where its dominance 
allowed for a level of convergence not attained by other Canadian or U.S. 
multimedia giants. Quebecor Media’s financial success, however, has come 
to some extent at the expense of its workers, who have been forced, in 
large part by the company’s provincial dominance, to accept lower wages 
and work longer hours. It has also allowed Quebecor Media to potentially 
impact the Canadian political system by financing creation of the Sun 
News Network, the effect of which should attract subsequent study. 
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